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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the sources of wage differentials among 
castes in Nepal, a country which had, until 1963, an age-old caste-
based social division of labor. We use an extended Oaxaca 
decomposition model with occupation and firm size augmenting the 
conventionally used measures of human capital endowments. Our 
results indicate that caste wage differentials in Nepal are large and that 
human capital endowments and lack of access to better paying 
occupations and larger firms have a significant impact. Furthermore, 
we find mixed evidence that the government policy of affirmative action 
has narrowed down the caste wage differential. 
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1 Introduction  
 
 
Labor market discrimination is defined as a situation in which a person who 
provides labor market services and is equally productive in a physical and material 
sense is paid less in a way that is related to gender, race, caste or ethnicity 
(Altonji and Blank, 1999). This concept emerged from the theories of taste 
discrimination, whereby employers directly hold preferences about the ethnic 
background of their employees (Becker, 1957, 1971) and statistical discrimination, 
whereby employers have incomplete information about workers' productivity and 
statistical priors about how productivity varies with ethnicity (Phelps, 1972). While 
considerable attention has been paid to racial labor market discrimination, less 
attention has been paid to caste even though caste-based discrimination might be 
more powerful and persistent than racial discrimination. Racism emerged in 
countries that were either colonized or participated in the slave trade during the 
colonial era, while caste-based societies have existed for centuries before 
colonialism (Deshpande, 2011). Moreover while, apart from the master-slave 
division of slavery, the colonial powers did not impose strict occupational 
restrictions on the population, caste-based stratification was inherently associated 
with an occupational division of labor. 
 
Caste discrimination persists in two self-perpetuating ways (Banerjee and 
Knight, 1985). First, caste classification discourages low-caste workers from 
developing their human capital in line with occupations assigned to the higher 
castes. Second, it subjects backward castes to informational and network 
disadvantages because of their exclusion from certain sectors of employment. 
Thus, a caste-based division of labor can perpetuate itself through the inter-
generational transmission of low educational and occupational status from one 
generation to the next even once discrimination per se is abolished (Borjas, 1994; 
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Darity and Mason, 1998). 
 
This paper examines the sources of wage differentials among castes in Nepal, 
a country in which, until 1963, an age-old, caste-based social division of labor was 
imposed by the national legal code Muluki Ain. The new Muluki Ain of 1963 
discarded this caste system. However, caste-based discrimination was itself 
declared illegal only after the promulgation of the new Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Nepal in 1990, which made the practice of untouchable illegal. Since then, 
several policies have been implemented to reduce the impact of such 
discrimination, including positive discrimination and the establishment of the Dalit 
Commission. The Second Amendment of the Civil Service Act, 1993, reserves 
45% of total vacancies in the public sector for backward castes, female, disabled 
and remote inhabitants. The effect of such policies has not been studied. This 
paper partly aims to fill this gap. 
 
In doing so, we follow the empirical literature and distinguish between pre-
market and current market labor discrimination. The first type of discrimination 
captures the effects of the propagation mechanisms mentioned above that 
contribute to the persistence of wage inequality even if active discrimination is no 
longer practiced by employers. The second type represents active discrimination 
by employers. The Oaxaca decomposition method (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) 
is the most commonly used technique for disentangling the two effects. Empirical 
studies based on the Oaxaca decomposition have focused on human capital 
endowments as the sole proxy for pre-market effects. In addition, Darity and 
Mason (1998) identifies group differences in access to better paying industries 
and occupations as major contributors to the persistence of labor market 
discrimination. Empirical work carried out by Banerjee and Knight (1985), Das and 
Dutta (2007) and Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) estimate such effects in the 
Indian labor market by incorporating occupation in the wage differential 
decomposition methodi. 
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In this paper, we go further in capturing the effects on wage inequality by 
introducing firm characteristics to supplement educational and occupational 
differences. In imperfectly competitive markets, firms may remunerate their 
employees differently, even if they have similar levels of education and work in the 
same occupation (Vi-etorisz and Harrison, 1973).ii In such a situation, employer 
characteristics such as size, profitability and reputation might matter as much in 
explaining wage differences as employee characteristics such as education and 
occupation. We proxy better paying employers by the size of their rms. The 
empirical literature provides evidence that larger firms hire higher quality workers 
(Brown and Medo, 1989; Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991; Hettler, 2007; 
Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas, 2009). Accordingly, we expand the 
Oaxaca method and estimate three separate decomposition models: one using 
occupation, another using firm size, and a third in which occupation is interacted 
with firm size. 
 
Our results indicate that caste wage discrimination is indeed present in the 
Nepalese labor market, with intermediate (Matwali) and low (Pani Nachalne) 
castes earning significantly less than the higher (Tagadahari) castes. For the 
Matwali, the wage differential decreases over the period of analysis, 2003 to 2010, 
which may reflect the effect of certain governmental policies to reduce caste 
discrimination. However, the wage differential increases for the Pani Nachalne. 
Lack of access to employment in certain occupations and large firms is found as a 
major factor behind the caste wage differential together with years of schooling. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical 
and institutional basis of caste classification in Nepal. Section 3 states the 
econometric model, while the data and descriptive statistics are presented in 
Section 4. The main econometric results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes and discusses policy implications. 
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2 Caste system in Nepal: An overview  
 
 
Nepal, along with other countries, had a caste-based social division of labour in 
the past. Historically, caste classification on the Indian subcontinent was based on 
the Varna system of Hindu philosophy and the Aryan division of labour. These 
comprised four categories, namely Brahman, Kshatriyas (Chhetri), Vaisyas and 
Shudras. Together these encompassed a social division of labour as priests and 
teachers, warriors and royalty, merchants and money lenders, and artisans, 
service providers and other manual workers, respectively (Bank, 2006; 
Deshpande, 2011). Brahman, being the superior caste, enjoyed the best status in 
Nepalese society, followed by Chhetri. While Vaisyas were not as privileged as 
Brahmans or Chhetri, they enjoyed relatively higher social status than Shudras in 
the caste-based social hierarchy. Shudras were the lowest caste, considered 
untouchable by their superiors. 
 
As a predominantly Hindu country with a significant Buddhist minority, Nepal's 
version of the Hindu caste system came with some variation, implemented in the 
form of a legal code called Muluki Ain. This code classified all Nepalese into 
different categories irrespective of their religious backgrounds, but based on their 
relative ritual purity (Bennet, Dahal, and Govindasamy, 2008). The official 
classification under 
Muluki Ain consisted of three categories, namely Tagadhari (literally "twice-born"), 
 
Matwali (literally "liquor drinking") and Pani Nachalne (literally "impure") (Cox, 
1988). Tagadahari included upper-caste Hindus such as the Brahmans of the 
traditional Hindu caste system. Matwali, on the other hand, consisted mainly of 
Buddhists and indigenous ethnic groups who practiced Animism and Shamanism, 
and were considered an intermediate caste. The Pani Nachalne were the lowest 
caste and included not just traditional Hindu untouchables such as Kami, Damai 
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and Sarki but also Muslims and Mlechha (literally "foreigners"), which in turn 
included Christians. Dalit is a designation for a group of people traditionally 
regarded as untouchable. This is where the intersection of caste and ethnicity 
entered into the social hierarchy of Nepal. Hofer (1979) and Gurung (2003) 
describe a hierarchy of ethnic groups and their respective associations with the 
legal caste categories. This divides all ethnic groups into two broader categories 
of ''pure" and ''impure" caste hierarchies consisting of three and two 
subcategories, respectively (see Table 1). While ethnic groups belonging to the 
Tagadhari and Matwali castes fell under ''pure" (or water acceptable, i.e. sharing 
water with them was acceptable), the Pani Nachalne were ''impure" (or water 
unacceptable). Within these there were subcategories: while the pure Matwali 
were divided into enslavable and non-enslavable, the impure Pani Nachalne were 
further divided into untouchable and touchable, depending on whether or not they 
belonged to Hindu religious groups. 
 
In line with these classifications, we aggregate caste-ethnic identity into three 
broad categories, namely Tagadhari, Matwali and Pani Nachalne. Lack of 
observations on the enslavable Matwali and touchable Pani Nachalne groups 
prevents us from constructing a finer division of the social hierarchy. We refer to 
these groups as castes although, from a strict point of view, they correspond to 
caste and ethnicity. 
 
3 Empirical model  
 
 
Consider caste categories j= t; m; p (Tagadhari= t, Matwali= m and Pani Nachalne 
 
= p). An expanded Mincerian log wage equation can be specified for each caste 
as, 
 
 ijijjijjijjij SSEw   ........................................................................(1) 
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where ijw  is the log hourly wage of individual i  of caste j , ijE  represents years of 
schooling completed, ijS  is a set of variables containing job characteristics such 
as occupation and/or firm size (see below), ijX  is a set of covariates comprising of 
a constant, experience, experience square, marital status, regional and industry 
dummies, and ɛ is the unobserved component  in the wage equation. The gross 
logarithmic caste wage differentials in observable variables can be calculated as,  
 ),()()( mmttmmttmmttmt XXSSEEww   .....................(2)          
    )()()( ppttppttppttpt XXSSEEww   ...........................(3) 
 
  where j.  is the mean of variable for caste j . 
   
Considering Tagadhari workers as the dominant/reference group and Matwali and 
 
Pain Nachalne workers as the non-dominant/comparison groups caste wage 
differentials among these groups can be decomposed into explained and 
unexplained components by employing the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition methodology. In the conventional Oaxaca methodology, the gross 
difference in mean log wages between the two groups can be decomposed into 
explained differences in the individual productivity characteristics (i.e. differences 
in SE,  and X ) and unexplained differences in the market valuation of such 
individual productivity characteristics (i.e. differences in  ,   and  ), 
  mmtmttmt EEEww )()(     
 
     mmtmtt SSS )()(    
 
     ,)()( mmtmtt XXX      .............................................(4) 
 
 
  pptpttpt EEEww )()(     
 
     pptptt SSS )()(    
 
     
.)()( pptptt XXX      .............................................(5) 
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As argued in Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) the Oaxaca decomposition 
requires that the dependence structure between the unobserved factors (i.e. ɛ ) 
and the observe variables is the same across groups (i.e. castes).  
We estimate the full decomposition model in equations (4) and (5) to evaluate 
the sources of caste wage differentials. For each decomposition, the first term 
denotes the wage difference attributable to the difference in observable 
characteristics between the two groups evaluated according to the dominant 
group's wage structure. The second term represents the wage difference because 
of differences in the wage structure between the two groups, evaluated at the 
mean level of the comparison groups. The former terms represent the explained 
components of the wage differential whereas the latter terms are the unexplained 
components. These are also known respectively as pre-market discrimination and 
current market discrimination. 
 
The decomposition in E  analyzes differences in education, which in the 
traditional Oaxaca decomposition is the main component of human capital. 
 
The decomposition in S  shows group differences in access to better jobs and 
this is the main contribution of this paper. As argued in Banerjee and Knight 
(1985), the choice of occupation can influence the wage a worker receives and 
that this is important for the rigid caste structure in India. Their methodology 
isolates the effect of productivity characteristics and occupational distribution on 
wages (see also Hinks and Watson, 2001, for a related analysis). As we argued 
above, access to jobs in medium and large firms can play a considerable role in 
producing wage differentials across groups of workers and this is particularly 
important for developing countries in which the average firm size is smaller than in 
developed countries. In order to evaluate the effect of occupation and firm size on 
caste wage differentials we consider three models. First, we only apply the 
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occupation decomposition, S  = {occupation}; second, we only apply the firm size 
decomposition, S = {firm size}; and finally, we consider decomposing the full 
interaction between occupation and firm size,  S = {occupation x firm size}. These 
models are referred as Occupational, Firm size and Interaction decomposition 
models, respectively.  
Finally, the decomposition in X  studies other characteristics such as industry, 
rural/urban or regional distribution of workers cannot be ruled out while estimating 
the sources of wage differentials across castes. 
 
4 Data and descriptive statistics  
 
 
This paper employs two waves of the National Living Standard Survey (NLSS) of 
Nepal for 2003/2004 and 2010/2011 carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
of Nepal with the combined support of the World Bank and the UK Department for 
International Development (these surveys will be referred below as 2003 and 
2010, respectively.) The surveys follow the World Bank's Living Standard 
Measurement Survey and apply a two-stage sampling scheme. 73 out of the 75 
administrative districts of Nepal are covered. A total of 5240 households in 2003 
and 5998 households in 2010 were interviewed, and information recorded about 
28110 and 28670 individuals in each of the respective years. The data include 
information on wage employment, self-employment, sector of employment, 
industry type, mode of payment, labor market attachment and educational 
attainment at the individual level. Since information on experience is not reported, 
it is proxied by age minus years of schooling minus six, which is the average age 
to start school in the Nepalese education system. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
every person joined the labor market immediately after completing their schooling. 
An individual is defined  as employed if he/she worked at least one hour during the 
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seven days prior to the interview. See the Appendix for the details of these 
classification plus definitions of all variables. 
 
    The analysis includes 785 in 2003 and 834 in 2010 male wage workers aged 
19-59 years old from the non-agricultural sector.iii Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. The Tagadhari group represents the dominant share 
of employees in both periods, accounting for 70.7% of the total employment in 
2003 and 71.3% in 2010. The Matwali accounted for 19.2% and 21.4%, and Pani 
Nachalne 9.9% and 7.3% in each survey year, respectively. 
Tables 2 and 3 show an average log hourly wage rate of 3.34 and 3.83 NPR 
respectively. The USD equivalent would be .38 and .68, respectively. iv The 
Matwali and Pani Nachalne workers earn on average wage 30% and 49% less 
than Tagadhari workers, respectively, in 2003. By 2010, the wage gap between 
the Tagadhari and Pani Nachalne remains identical whereas it has been 
decreased to 20% in case of the wage gap between the Tagadhari and Matwali 
workers. 
 
Average years of education, defined as the highest level of completed years of 
schooling were 7.78 in 2003 and 9.88 in 2010. The education gap between 
Tagadhari and Matwali was 2.29 years in 2003 and by 2010 it had decreased 
slightly to 2.10 years. However, the educational gap between Tagadhari and the 
lowest caste Pani Nachalne increased over this period, from 3.03 years in 2003 to 
4.45 years in 2010. 
 
The NLSS survey contains a question about the size of the firm where the 
wage worker works. As described in the Appendix it contains three categories: 1 
employee, 2-10 employees, and more than 10 employees. We use the ad-hoc 
classification of small, medium and large firms, respectively. This variable has a 
high proportion of missing observations, i.e. non-respondents, which resulted in a 
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particular distribution of workers across occupations. In the robustness section 
below we consider the imputation of firm size to certain occupations. 
 
We aggregate occupations into seven broad groups based on Nepal's National 
Classification of Occupations: professional, clerical, service, skilled, sales, agri-
worker and unskilled. The professional category includes the categories of doctor, 
engineer, manager, religious and clerical comprises of categories such as clerk, 
typist, book keeper, etc. Those not included in any of the six occupations are 
classified as unskilled workers which in turn includes loaders, unskilled 
construction workers and laborers. Similarly, eight categories of industry are 
constructed based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) reported in the 
survey. 
In 2003, the occupational ranking is as follows: professionals is the largest 
category accounting for 38.6% of workers, unskilled is second largest with 18.4% 
followed by skilled workers at 17.9%. By 2010 the rankings are 28.2% for skilled, 
23.9% for professional and 19.1% for clerical. The professional and clerical 
occupations, which collectively correspond to white collar jobs, have a higher 
proportion of Tagadhari workers, while the lower castes Matwali and Pani 
Nachalne workers are more engaged in unskilled and skilled occupations. In order 
to highlight the role of firm size, Table 4 report average wages in 2003 and 2010 
by occupation in the three firm size categories we consider. In all cases, larger 
firms pay higher wages than smaller ones. 
 
In terms of the workers' industry, the majority of workers are in the service, 
manufacturing and other industry classification.v There are no significant 
differences between the Tagadhari and Matwali workers with respect to their 
association to industries. The Pani Nachalne workers are more likely to work in 
the manufacturing industry.vi Information is not available to distinguish between 
public and private sector employees. 
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In summary, the descriptive statistics indicate that caste-based disparities in 
key labor market outcomes continue to play an important role in Nepal. The 
intermediate Matwali group have managed to slightly close the gap with the 
dominant Tagadhari group, while the lowest caste Pani Nachalne appears to have 
fallen further behind. However, the descriptive statistics alone cannot tell us which 
are the key drivers of these disparities are. 
 
5 Econometric analysis  
5.1 Access to large  firms and occupations by caste  
 
 
We first evaluate if there are differences in access to large firms and occupations 
by caste, after controlling for other observed characteristics. 
 
Table 5 presents probit estimates for access to large rms. The results show 
that both Matwali and Pani Nachalne castes are less likely to work in large firms in 
2003 (column 1), while for 2010 only the Pani Nachalne effect remains significant 
(column 3) but of smaller magnitude. This provides some evidence of a reduction 
in caste discrimination in access to large firms. Interacting the caste dummy 
variables with education reveals that caste discrimination for the Pani Nachalne is 
more prevalent for the less educated in 2003 (column 2). The interaction provides 
no significance in 2010. 
 
Table 5 presents a multinomial logit model for access to occupations (base 
category Unskilled). Convergence issues on the multinomial models with few 
observations make us to consider a reduced models with only key covariates. The 
2003 results show that Taghadari workers are more likely to work in Professional 
occupations, but less in Skilled occupations. The other occupations show no clear 
pattern. For 2010, however, the statistical significance is further reduced and no 
clear conclusions can be extracted. Taghadari workers are more likely to work in 
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Clerical occupations and less in Skilled, as compared to Matwali. 
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5.2 Baseline regression analysis  
 
 
Wage regression analysis was carried out to estimate the underlying wage 
equations for each sample period. The estimates are listed in tables 7 for 2003 
and 8 for 2010. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report results of separate regressions for each 
of the three castes, followed by the pooled sample results in column 4 with caste 
dummy variables, where the Tagadhari caste represents the reference caste.  
Returns to education for the pooled sample are positive, increasing with time, and 
statistically 0.018 (significant at 5%) and 0.070 (significant at 1% level) in 2003 
and 2010, respectively. However, they vary considerably across caste groups. In 
2003, the Tagadhari caste has positive and significant returns, while Pani 
Nachalne and Matwali depicts a negative but statistically not significant education 
coefficient. In 2010, these coefficients increased markedly for each group and are 
statistically significant. The Tagadhari has the highest returns to education 
followed by the Pani Nachalne and Matwali groups. 
Firm size plays a crucial role in determining wages in the Tagadhari and 
Matwali sub-samples. For example, in 2003, those belonging to the Tagadhari 
group and working in medium-sized and large-sized firm were likely to earn a 
premium of respectively 34:7% and 57:9% compared to those working in small 
rms. The same measures ac-count for 59:2% and 56:2% for the Matwali sub-
sample. Firm size coefficients other than the medium firm in the Matwali sub-
sample are similar in the latter period. These coefficients are statistically not 
signicant in the Pani Nachalne sub-sample. 
 
The results for occupational effects (with reference group = unskilled workers) 
show mixed significance across sub-samples. For instance, professional, clerical 
and skilled occupations are the main contributors of the Tagadhari worker's wage 
in 2003. Occupational categories other than professional and sales do not show 
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any significant impact on Matwali worker's wages in this period. None of the 
occupation coefficients are found statistically significant in the Pani Nachalne sub-
sample. In the second period, professional occupation continues to have a 
positive impact on the Tagadhari worker's wage whereas professional, clerical and 
skilled occupations seem to have positive impact on the Matwali worker's wage. 
As in 2003, none of the occupations seem to have significant impact on wage 
earning by the Pani Nachalne workers. 
 
Industry-type effects (with reference group = Agriculture) are not consistent 
across sub-samples and reflect variability in the base category. 
 
     In the pooled regression using caste dummies in column 4, the coefficients on 
the dummies are negative for both castes in 2003. However, the Matwali 
coefficient is not statistically significant in this period. In contrast, both caste 
dummy coefficients became positive although still not significant in 2010. This 
shows that in order to explore caste wage differentials, the Oaxaca decomposition 
model is necessary. 
5.3 Decomposition results  
 
 
Three different decomposition models are employed to study the sources of wage 
differentials. These models are hereafter referred as the Occupational, Firm size 
and Interaction decomposition models. Each model consists of three components; 
namely (1) explained and unexplained wage differences attributable to differences 
in education endowments, (2) explained and unexplained wage differences 
attributable to differences in job characteristics ( firm size and/or occupation), (3) 
explained and unexplained wage differences attributable to differences in other 
variables including the constant term. 
 
  The results are presented in tables 9 and 10 for the years 2003 and 2010, 
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respectively. These tables present only the summary results. Detailed 
decomposition results are not presented in order to save space but can be 
provided upon request. 
 
The decomposition results show that wage gaps attributable to differences in 
human capital endowments (i.e. education, explained, )( mtt EE   and 
)( ptt EE  , generally considered as being the main source of wage gaps among 
workers, explains less than half of the wage differentials in 2003 but more than 
three-fourths in 2010. For 2003 and for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage differential, 
the Occupational model shows that differences in education endowments are 
0.060 out of a total wage gap of 0.299, and this corresponds to 0.096 and 0.057 
for the Firm size and Interaction models. For the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage 
differential, the Occupational model shows that differences in education 
endowments are 0.080 out of 0.493, and this corresponds to 0.128 and 0.076 for 
the Firm size and Interaction models. In 2010, the Tagadhari - Matwali wage 
differential decreases to 0.199, and this is explained by differences in education 
endowments by 0.179, 0.213, 0.150 for the Occupational, Firm size and 
Interaction decomposition models, respectively. Moreover the Tagadhari - Pani 
Nachalne wage differential is 0.489 in 2010, and this is explained by differences in 
education endowments by 0.380, 0.454, 0.319 for the Occupational, Firm size and 
Interaction decomposition models, respectively. 
The wage gaps arising from differences in job characteristics (i.e. job, 
explained, )( mtt SS   and )( ptt SS  are statistically significant, and they show a 
consistent positive effect. The results show that the largest effect is obtained when 
using the Interaction decomposition model. Overall, this shows that access to jobs 
in better occupations and higher paying firms plays a non-trivial part in explaining 
the wage gaps across castes. In 2003, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage 
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differential, differences in occupation explain a gap of 0.127, differences in firm 
size explain 0.077 and the interaction of the two 0.180 (out of 0.299); while for the 
Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential, each model explains 0.128, 0.063, 
0.191 (out of 0.493), respectively. In 2010, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage 
differential, differences in occupation explain a gap of 0.041, differences in firm 
size explain 0.032 and the interaction of the two 0.084 (out of 0.199); while for the 
Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential, each model explains 0.088, 0.078, 
0.227 (out of 0.489), respectively. 
 
The wage gaps arising from differences in job characteristics (i.e. job, 
explained, )( mtt SS   and )( ptt SS   are statistically significant, and they show a 
consistent positive effect. The results show that the largest effect is obtained when 
using the Interaction decomposition model. Overall, this shows that access to jobs 
in better occupations and higher paying firms plays a non-trivial part in explaining 
the wage gaps across castes. In 2003, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage 
differential, differences in occupation explain a gap of 0.129, differences in firm 
size explain 0.066 and the interaction of the two 0.185 (out of 0.277); while for the 
Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential, each model explains 0.131, 0.055, 
0.205 (out of 0.371), respectively. In 2010, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage 
differential, differences in occupation explain a gap of 0.051, differences in firm 
size explain 0.034 and the interaction of the two 0.090 (out of 0.209); while for the 
Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential, each model explains 0.092, 0.079, 
0.217 (out of 0.537), respectively. 
     The differences in endowments in variables other than education, occupation 
and firm size (i.e.  Others, explained,  )( mtt XX   and )( ptt XX   generally 
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appear as statistically insignificant. Moreover, the unexplained differences in wage 
gaps attributable to education (i.e. differences in returns to education), job 
characteristics (occupation and/or firm size), and other components are in general 
not statistically significant, although some of them are large in magnitude. Note 
that the later contains industry as one component which preliminary estimations 
show it is not relevant for the decomposition. 
   The differences in endowments in variables other than education, occupation and 
firm size (i.e.  others, explained, )( mtt XX   and )( ptt XX   generally appear as 
statistically non-significant. Moreover, the unexplained differences in wage gaps 
attributable to education (i.e. differences in returns to education), job 
characteristics (occupation and/or firm size), and other components are in general 
not statistically significant, although some of them are large in magnitude. Note 
that the later contains industry as one component which preliminary estimations 
show it is not relevant for the decomposition. 
 
One important point to arise from this analysis is that the Tagadhari - Matwali 
wage differential decreased in 2010 whereas the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage 
differential remained constant. The underlying reason could be that there is a 
slightly reduction in the gaps in human capital endowment in the former 
comparison group which has been widened in the case of the latter group. The 
Matwali group have improve their access to better jobs with a relative 
improvement in educational attainment in the latter period. For instance, 
Interaction decomposition results shows that the job-explained component of the 
Tagadhari- Matwali wage differential has decreased to 0.084 in 2010 relative to 
0.180 in 2003 while it has increased in the case of Tagadhari-Pani Nachalne wage 
differential. This indicates that although government introduced a policy of 
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affirmative action providing quotas in public sector jobs, the Pani Nachalne group 
might not have been able to take this advantage because of a lack of minimum 
level of education required for public sector jobs. 
5.4 Robustness: Imputation of missing  firm size  
 
 
In our preceding analysis, we had restricted ourselves to a subset of workers who 
had explicitly reported the firm size of their employer. This exclusion had resulted 
in a higher proportion of workers in the professional and clerical occupations in our 
sub-sample than in the overall sample. It could therefore be suspected that the 
estimated decomposition results may be attributable to group differences in 
access to white collar jobs rather than group differences in access to larger rms. 
We thus propose another firm size measurement that might still suffer from 
measurement error but that serves to evaluate the robustness of the previous 
results. Note that both, previous and new, firm size variables are (imperfect) 
proxies for the quality of the firm and the job. 
 
In order to test for this possible bias, we construct an extended sample by 
imputing a large firm size when missing for certain occupations where the size can 
be detectable from the work description reported in the survey questionnaire but 
imputing the rest to small rm. Work descriptions given by production/operation 
department managers, architect, engineers, nursing/midwifery professionals, 
primary and secondary education teachers, other teaching professionals, business 
professionals, computer technicians, optical/electronic equipment operators, 
modern health associates, administrative personal, secretaries/clerks, library/mail 
clerks, cashier/tellers clerks, client information clerks, travel attendants, 
housekeeping and restaurant workers are considered as working for the large rm. 
The rest of workers with missing firm size are imputed as small firm, except for 
agricultural, fishery, brick/glass workers and porters for which firm size cannot be 
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clearly assigned and they are therefore excluded from the imputation exercise. 
 
    Table 11 reports the original and imputed  firm size distribution. It should be 
noted that the imputation exercise increases mostly those assigned to small firms. 
This imputation leads to a significant increment in the sample size (from 785 to 
1357 in 2003 and from 834 to 1110 in 2010) and a reduction in the proportion of 
white collar jobs. The proportion of professional and clerical workers is reduced to 
23.37% and 7.59% from 38.30% and 12.08% in 2003, respectively, and to 19.91% 
and 14.59% from 23.86% and 18.71% in 2010. Tables 12 and 13 presents the 
distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry, before and after the 
imputation exercise. 
 
   Decomposition results for the extended sample are listed in Tables 14 and 15. If 
the difference in access to white collar occupations was driving the baseline 
results is valid, then it is expected that the explained components of access to 
jobs will be smaller in the extended sample than in the baseline sample, 
particularly for 2003 where the proportion of white collars jobs has been 
significantly reduced in the extended sample. In 2003, the results for the Job-
Explained component increases while the Education-Explained component is 
slightly reduced. For instance, in the Interaction model, the Job-Explained 
increases to 0.211 from 0.180 in the Matwali and to 0.225 from 0.191 for the Pani 
Nachalne groups. In 2010, on the contrary, the Job-Explained component 
decreases although the Interaction model still continues to have the largest effect. 
Overall the results are qualitatively similar to those of the original sample, and 
thus, they confirm that access to jobs in larger firms play an important role in 
explaining caste discrimination. 
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6 Conclusions and policy implications  
 
 
In this paper we investigate the sources of caste wage differentials in Nepal by ex-
tending the conventional Oaxaca methodology to include both occupational and 
firm size effects. The study covered two different surveys over a time span of 
seven years (2003 and 2010), a period of radical political change in Nepal. We 
find that caste wage inequality is present in the Nepalese labor market in both 
2003 and 2010. At the same time, our results indicate that differences in human 
capital endowments are important for explaining wage inequality, but so are 
occupational and firm size effects, especially when the latter two are taken 
together. Within the components of discrimination that are related to access to 
better jobs our results indicate that such access continues to exist for reasons 
other than differences in human capital for both Matwali and Pani Nachalne 
disadvantaged groups. This suggests that discriminatory behavior by employers 
continues to exist in Nepal. 
 
Overall, the government's policy intended to reverse historical caste labor 
market discrimination, for instance by imposing quotas in public sector 
employment, has not been successful enough to overcome other barriers that 
prevent under-privileged workers from accessing such jobs. If any, the 
government policy has benefit Matwali workers but not Pani Nachalne ones. The 
analysis suggests that together with increasing human capital endowments of 
disadvantaged groups, increasing access to better jobs has an important role in 
narrowing down discrimination. 
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Appendix: Variables definition 
 
 
Tagadhari Taking value 1 if an individual's ethnicity is reported as Brahmin, Chhetri, 
 Newar and Yadav; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Matwali Taking value 1 if an individual's ethnicity is reported as Gurung, Magar, 
 Tharu, Tamang, Rai and Limbu; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Pani Nachalne Taking value 1 if an individual's ethnicity is reported as Damai, Kami, Sarki 
 and Muslim; and 0 otherwise. 
  
lhwage log of hourly wage (cash, in-kind, bonus, transport, and medical allowances). 
  
Education Years of schooling completed (the highest level completed). 
  
Experience Age-years of schooling-6. 
  
Married Taking value 1 if an individual is married; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Small  firm Taking value 1 if a  firm employs only one employee; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Medium  firm Taking value 1 if a  firm employs 2-10 employees; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Large  firm 
Taking value 1 if a  firm employs more than 10 employees; and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Eastern Taking value 1 if an individual works in eastern administrative region; and 
 0 otherwise. 
  
Central Taking value 1 if an individual works in central administrative region; and 
 0 otherwise. 
  
Western Taking value 1 if an individual works in eastern administrative region; and 
 0 otherwise. 
  
Mid-western Taking value 1 if an individual works in mid-western administrative region; 
 and 0 otherwise. 
  
Far-western Taking value 1 if an individual works in far-western administrative region; 
 and 0 otherwise. 
  
Abroad Taking value 1 if an individual works outside Nepal; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Unskilled Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is not included in other cate- 
 gories; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Professional Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is reported as doctor, engineer, 
 administrative executive, religious professional etc.; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Clerical Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is reported as clerk, typist, 
 book keeper, telephone operator, military, other clerical; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Service Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is reported as travel, trekking, 
 cooking, housekeeping, care takers, laundry workers, barbers and other ser- 
 vice worker; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Sales Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is reported as shop and stall 
 sales person; 0, otherwise. 
  
Agri-worker Taking value 1 an individual's occupation is reported as farm manager, 
 farm worker, agricultural worker, forestry worker,  fisherman, hunters and 
 trapper; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Skilled Taking value 1 if an individual's occupation is reported as metal processor, 
 chemical processor, plumber, welders, jewellery workers, paper makers; and 
 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix: continued 
 
 
Agricultural Taking value 1 if industry is reported as agricultural, forestry and logging and 
 fishing; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Mining Taking value 1 if industry is reported as coal mining, petroleum gas, metal 
 mining and other mining; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Manufacturing Taking value 1 if industry is reported as food and beverage, textile apparel, 
 wood furniture paper printing, handicrafts, other metallic; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Construction Taking value 1 if industry is reported buildings, street highways, water ports 
 project, irrigation, electricity gas and water; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Trade Taking value 1 if industry is reported as wholesale, retail and restaurant; and 
 0 otherwise. 
  
FRE Taking value 1 if industry is reported as  finance, insurance and real estate; 
 and 0 otherwise. 
  
Service sector Taking value 1 if industry is reported as transport, communication, recreation 
 and cultural and international; and 0 otherwise. 
  
Other Taking value 1 if industry is not responded or is responded as other; and 0 
 otherwise. 
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Table 1: Nepal social hierarchy: 1854 
 
Hierarchy Habitat Belief/Religion 
   
A. Water acceptable(pure)   
1.Tagadhari: Wearer of the sacred thread 
  
\Upper Caste" (Brahmin) Hills Hinduism 
\ Upper caste" (Madhesi) Tarai Hinduism 
\ Upper Caste" (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hindusim 
2. Matwali: Alcohol drinkers(non-enslavable) 
  
Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar Hills Tribal / Shamanism 
Thakali, Rai, Limbu Hills Tribal / Shamanism 
Newar Kathmandu Valley Buddhism 
3. Matwali:Alcohol drinkers(enslavable) 
  
Bhote(Tamang) Mountain/Hills Buddhisim 
Gharti,Chepang, Hayu Hills  
Kumal , Tharu Inner Tarai Animism 
B. Water unacceptable (impure)   
1. Pani Nachalne: Touchable 
  
Dhobi, Kasai, Kusule, Kalu Kathmandu Valley Hinduism 
Musalman Tarai Islam 
Mlechha(Foreigner) Europe Christianity etc. 
2. Pani Nachalne: Untouchable(achhut) 
  
Badi, Damai ,Gaine Hill Hinduism 
Kadara, Kami, Sarki(Parbatiya) Hills Hinduism 
Chhyame, Pode (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hinduism 
   
   
Source: Adapted from Bennet, Dahal, and Govindasamy (2008). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: 2003 
 
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne 
     
Caste 1.00 .707(.016) .192(.014) .099(.010) 
     
Lhwage 3.34(.033) 3.45(.039) 3.15(.073) 2.96(.099) 
Education 7.78(.172) 8.53(.201) 6.24(.361) 5.5(.557) 
Experience 20.69(.411) 20.22(.475) 21.38(.946) 22.65(1.50) 
Experience2 560.66(20.32) 534.35(22.81) 591.60(48.35) 687.62(80.33) 
Married .825(.013) .810(.016) .880(.026) .820(.043) 
Rural .798(.014) .761(.018) .934(.020) .794(.046) 
Lnholding('00000) 7.34(.733) 8.44(.994) 6.08(1.04) 2.01(.308) 
     
Small  firm .059(.008) .043(.008) .106(.025) .077(.030) 
Medium  firm .419(.017) .383(.020) .497(.040) .526(.056) 
Large  firm .522 (.017) .574(.021) .397(.039) .397(.055) 
     
Eastern .121(.011) .096(.012) .139(.028) .253(.049) 
Central .421(.017) .447(.021) .374(.039) .333(.053) 
Western .136(.012) .125(.014) .189(.031) .116(.036) 
Mid-western .070(.009) .066(.010) .083(.022) .077(.030) 
Far-western .046(.007) .047(.008) .063(.019) - 
Abroad .206(.014) .219(.017) .152(.028) .221(.046) 
     
Unskilled .184(.013) .161(.015) .278(.036) .167(.042) 
Professional .386(.017) .451(.021) .245(.035) .192(.044) 
Clerical .122(.011) .133(.014) .073(.021) .128(.038) 
Service .057(.008) .045(.008) .086(.022) .090(.032) 
Sales .047(.007) .054(.009) .026(.013) .038(.021) 
Agri-worker .025(.005) .014(.004) .046(.017) .064(.027) 
Skilled .179(.013) .142(.014) .246(.035) .321(.053) 
     
Agriculture .022(.005) .019(.005) .026(.013) .026(.018) 
Mining .014(.004) .013(.004) .020(.011) .013(.012) 
Manufacturing .193(.014) .152(.015) .238(.034) .397(.055) 
Construction .034(.006) .029(.007) .066(.020) .012(.012) 
Trade .093(.010) .107(.013) .060(.019) .064(.027) 
FRE .034(.006) .045(.008) .013(.009) - 
Servicesec .451(.017) .471(.021) .444(.040) .321(.053) 
Others .159(.013) .164(.015) .133(.027) .167(.042) 
     
Obs. 785 554 153 78 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. "-" indicates no observations. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: 2010 
 
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne 
     
Caste 1.00 .713(.015) .214(.014) .073(.009) 
     
Lhwage 3.89(.029) 3.96(.034) 3.76(.059) 3.47(.102) 
Education 9.88(.129) 10.66(.131) 8.56(.304) 6.21(.573) 
Experience 19.56(.392) 19.27(.457) 20.77(.892) 18.91(1.48) 
Experience2 510.11(17.95) 495.00(20.51) 569.31(42.33) 487.58(70.51) 
Married .792(.014) .790(.016) .810(.029) .766(.055) 
Rural .731(.015) .710(.018) .815(.029) .786(.052) 
Lnholding('00000) 29.92(3.98) 36.80(5.15) 14.74(6.84) 6.00(1.95) 
     
Small  firm .030(.006) .023(.006) .052(.016) .067(.032) 
Medium  firm .332(.016) .290(.018) .339(.035) .617(.063) 
Large  firm .638(.016) .685(.019) .609(.037) .316(.060) 
     
Eastern .105(.010) .094(.012) .126(.025) .133(.044) 
Central .608(.016) .652(.019) .551(.037) .350(.062) 
Western .157(.012) .148(.014) .167(.028) .217(.053) 
Mid-western .073(.009) .064(.010) .075(.019) .150(.046) 
Far-western .038(.006) .027(.006) .052(.016) .100(.008) 
Abroad .019(.004) .013(.004) .029(.012) .050(.028) 
     
Unskilled .084(.009) .072(.010) .126(.025) .083(.035) 
Professional .239(.014) .283(.018) .149(.027) .067(.032) 
Clerical .191(.013) .224(.017) .086(.021) .166(.048) 
Service .127(.011) .115(.013) .121(.024) .267(.057) 
Sales .066(.008) .071(.010) .046(.015) .083(.035) 
Agri-worker .008(.003) .001(.001) .023(.011) .033(.023) 
Skilled .282(.015) .231(.017) .448(.037) .300(.059) 
     
Agriculture .007(.002) .008(.003) .005(.005) - 
Mining .008(.003) .008(.003) .011(.008) - 
Manufacturing .129(.011) .106(.012) .149(.027) .300(.059) 
Construction .035(.006) .027(.006) .052(.016) .067(.032) 
Trade .079(.009) .081(.011) .051(.016) .133(.044) 
Servicesec .193(.013) .179(.015) .247(.032) .183(.050) 
FRE .065(.008) .074(.010) .057(.017) - 
Others .481(.017) .515(.020) .425(.037) .317(.060) 
     
Obs. 834 594 179 61 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses."-"  indicates no observations. 
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Table 4: Wages by occupation and  firm size 
 
  
Year: 2003 
  
Year: 2010 
 
       
Occupation Small  firm Medium  firm Large  firm Small  firm Medium  firm Large  firm 
       
Unskilled 2.26(0.772) 2.90(0.941) 3.09(0.608) 3.26(.769) 3.37(0.617) 3.64(0.715) 
Professional 3.08(1.50) 3.48(0.907) 3.91(0.874) 4.50(1.27) 4.50(0.936) 4.52(0.762) 
Clerical 2.16(1.26) 3.14(0.628) 3.78(0.761) - 3.86(0.846) 4.02(0.638) 
Service 2.65(0.951) 3.02(1.06) 3.19(0.393) - 3.19(0.704) 3.83(0.723) 
Sales 2.59(0.260) 2.65(0.868) 3.13(.291) 3.09(0.580) 3.23(0.460) 3.66(0.640) 
Agri-worker 3.06(.659) 3.14(1.03) 3.67(0.792) 3.17(2.52) - 3.41(0.431) 
Skilled 2.77(0.490) 3.14(0.897) 3.15(0.793) 3.07(0.430) 3.28(0.720) 3.96(0.650) 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. \-" indicates no observations. 
 
Table 5: Probit model for access to large firms: Dep. var. : dummy=1 for large firm, 
0 otherwise 
 
Variables Year: 2003 Year: 2010 
     
 
1 2 3 4 
     
Education .009**(.004) .007(.005) .035***(.006) .040***(.008) 
Experience .011*(.007) .013*(.007) .006(.006) .006(.006) 
Experience2 -.000(.000) -.000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) 
Married -.053(.061) -.052(.062) .039(.058) .041(.058) 
Rural -.158**(.069) -.164**(.069) -.031(.042) .032(.042) 
Lnholding .365***(.120) .373***(.120) -.011(.015) -.011(.015) 
     
Eastern .075(.102) .066(.104) .222***(.057) .218***(.057) 
Central .195**(.089) .194**(.089) .123*(.059) .116*(.059) 
Western .201**(.091) .194**(.092) -.112(.090) -.113(.090) 
Mid-western .088(.109) .092(.108) -.026(.103) -.023(.104) 
Abroad .076(.096) .073(.096) .092(.120) .079(.122) 
     
Professional .098*(.060) .101*(.060) -.156*(.086) -.165*(.087) 
Clerical .039(.074) -.040(.074) -.031(.082) -.033(.082) 
Service .112(.086) .124(.087) .009(.085) .005(.085) 
Sales -.382***(.076) -.382***(.076) -.483***(.113) -.485***(.113) 
Agri-worker -.183(.125) -.170***(.127) .272*(.085) .251*(.100) 
Skilled -.009(.063) -.002(.063) -.048(.073) -.050(.073) 
     
Mining .310(.157) .324*(.148) .136(.223) .135(.222) 
Manufacturing .052(.150) .065(.150) .162(.145) .153(.145) 
Construction -.214(.157) -.204(.159) .120(.163) .119(.160) 
Trade -.134(.157) -.129(.157) .146(.162) .140(.161) 
FRE -.013(.182) -.002(.181) .018(.176) .014(.173) 
Servicesec -.192(.143) -.190(.142) .142(.149) .134(.150) 
Others .017(.149) .025(.148) .221(.168) .216(.165) 
     
Matwali*Education - .005(.011) - -.009(.011) 
Pani Nachalne*Education - .021*(.013) - -.016(.015) 
     
Matwali -.154***(.049) -.196**(.083) -.047(.047) .037(.109) 
Pani Nachalne -.154**(.063) -.270***(.092) -.207***(.080) -.073(.138) 
     
Pseudo R2 .1156 .1179 1629 .1640 
Log likelihood ratio -480.75 -479.50 -457.02 -456.40 
Obs. 785 785 834 834 
     
     
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. * significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit model for access to occupations 
 
Dependent variable: Occupational categorical variable 
 
Year: 2003 
 
 Professional Clerical Service Sales Agri-worker Skilled 
Education .034***(.004) .009***(.003) -.003***(.001) -.001(.001) -.003***(.001) -.012***(.002) 
Experience -.003**(.002) -.001(.001) .000(.000) .000(.000) .001(.001) -.001(.001) 
Rural .015(.047) -.053(.047) .079**(.036) -.002(.020) .021**(.009) -.050(.039) 
Lnholding .439***(.145) .269***(.071) -.382***(.123) -.073(.122) .039(.028) -.73*(.159) 
Matwali -.164***(.044) -.030(.033) .030(.022) -.029*(.017) .021(.016) .119***(.043) 
Pani Nachalne -.185***(.056) .036(.048) .020(.027) -.016(.023) .040(.029) .167***(.058) 
Log likelihood ratio   -1154.62    
Obs.   785    
   Year: 2010    
Education .046***(.009) .033***(.007) -.025***(.004) -.003(.003) -.001(.001) -.034***(.007) 
Experience .002***(.000) .002**(.001) -.005***(.001) -.003***(.001) .000(.000) .000(.000) 
Rural -.010(.010) -.045(.029) .032(.033) .015(.033) -.001(.004) .048(.042) 
Lnholding -.002(.003) .010(.023) .014(.024) .001(.008) .000(.000) .013(.016) 
Matwali -.007(.010) -.154***(.038) -.028(.033) -.038*(.023) .007(.007) .188***(.047) 
Pani Nachalne .010(.028) .031(.075) .048(.055) .001(.041) .007(.009) -.055(.073) 
Log likelihood ratio   -1150.02    
Obs.   834    
       
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Unskilled occupation as base category. 
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Table 7: Regression results: 2003 
 
 Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Dummy 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Education .024***(.009) -.009(.021) -.002(.035) .016**(.007) 
Experience .030**(.015) .000(.025) -.029(.035) .026**(.011) 
Experience2 -.000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) -.000(.000) 
Married .041(.102) .263(.229) .472*(.262) .113(.088) 
Lnholding -.000(.003) -.007(.024) -.071(.155) -.000(.003) 
     
Medium  firm .347**(.203) .592**(.248) -.179(.410) .366***(.138) 
Large  firm .579***(.200) .562**(.254) .561(.433) .601***(.139) 
     
Eastern .045(.225) -.116(.259) -.454*(.288) -.032(.171) 
Central .247(.191) .146(.236) -.439(.429) .196(.152) 
Western .188*(.203) .779**(.319) dropped .299*(.167) 
Mid-western .243(.224) .251(.249) -.587(.627) .208(.173) 
Abroad .194(.200) .431*(.273) -.197(.432) .190(.160) 
     
Professional .639***(.113) .540***(.217) .107(.363) .647***(.093) 
Clerical .317**(.124) .054(.324) .275(.445) .389***(.109) 
Service .050(.197) .322(.316) -.119(.444) .132(.157) 
Sales .005(.205) .729***(.226) -.542(.596) .056(.165) 
Agri-worker .277(.455) -.184(.301) -.111(.576) .356*(.205) 
Skilled .195*(.131) .212(.187) .225(.455) .301***(.100) 
     
Mining -.180(.334) -.173(.595) .387(.502) -.169(.259) 
Manufacturing .012(.331) -.708**(.324) .233(.534) -.094(.212) 
Construction .156(.343) .053(.369) 1.28***(.465) .215(.226) 
Trade -.189(.335) -.705**(.344) .027(.503) -.252(.218) 
FRE .663*(.356) -.209(.407) - .594**(.255) 
Servicesec .092(.314) -.262(.334) -.296(.366) -.009(.202) 
Others .195(.324) .525(.444) .467(.573) .246(.211) 
     
Matwali - - 
- 
- -.083(.077) 
Pani Nachalne - - -.244**(.110) 
     
Constant 1.73***(.450) 2.08***(.519) 3.00***(.811) 1.76***(.311) 
R2 .2738 .4010 .4237 .2718 
Obs. 555 153 78 786 
     
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%. 
 
Base categories: Small firm, Unskilled, Agricultural and Tagadhari are omitted categories 
for firm size, occupation, industry-type and caste dummy variables, respectively. 
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Table 8: Regression results: 2010 
 
 Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Dummy 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Education .078***(.012) .058**(.017) .077*(.041) .066***(.009) 
Experience .011(.012) .072***(.020) .028(.042) .033***(.010) 
Experience2 -.000(.000) -.001(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) 
Married .239**(.113) -.125(.156) .100(.320) .131*(.086) 
Lnholding .000(.000) -.000(.001) .032(.031) -.000(.000) 
     
Medium  firm .305**(.146) .304*(.205) -.282(.831) .265*(.137) 
Large  firm .492***(.149) .583***(.186) .149(.863) .487***(.137) 
     
Eastern .155(.150) -.304(.326) -.086(.685) .025(.128) 
Central .210*(.125) .096(.282) .635(.658) .245**(.109) 
Western .048(.154) -.105(.301) .042(.670) .063(.123) 
Mid-western .335*(.203) -.271(.335) .676(.696) .286*(.160) 
Abroad .313(.309) -.683(.318) .348(.799) .086(.202) 
     
Professional .498***(.140) .742***(.225) -.142(.826) .618***(.110) 
Clerical .150(.125) .374*(.233) -.546(.713) .253**(.100) 
Service .052(.138) .176(.223) -.197(.474) .156*(.107) 
Sales -.649***(.197) -.526*(.330) .127(.932) -.370*(.187) 
Agri-worker .144(.134) .322(.590) -.806(.538) -.073(.350) 
Skilled .017(.121) .373**(.175) -.404(.545) .170*(.089) 
     
Mining -.729**(.349) .131(.342) - -.436(.369) 
Manufacturing -.289(.317) .573**(.276) -.013(.832) -.058(.345) 
Construction -.221(.344) .939***(.294) - .067(.356) 
Trade .147(.326) .899***(.323) -.482(.972) .232(.353) 
Servicesec -.434(.313) .520*(.311) -.190(.838) -.192(.344) 
FRE -.044(.329) .915***(.266) - .177(.355) 
Others -.239(.310) .656***(.242) -.494(.666) -.031(.340) 
     
Matwali - - - .043(.056) 
Pani Nachalne - - - .064(.113) 
     
Constant 2.27***(.375) 1.57***(.496) 2.69**(1.10) 2.02***(.398) 
R2 .3724 .4819 .3315 .3708 
Obs. 594 179 61 834 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%. 
 
Base categories: Small firm, Unskilled, Agricultural and Tagadhari are omitted categories 
for firm size, occupation, industry-type and caste dummy variables, respectively. 
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Table 9: Oaxaca decomposition results: 2003 
 
  
Education 
 
Job 
 
Other 
 Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
      
   
Tagadhari vs. Matwali 
  
       
Occupational .299*** .060** .198* .127*** 0.029 .016 -.131 
 (.089) (.023) (.153) (.036) (.044) (.027) (.200) 
Firm size .299*** .096*** .161 .077*** .059 .041 -.135 
 (.086) (.026) (.127) (.025) (.418) (.029) (.297) 
Interaction .299*** .057** .265* .180*** .201 .014 -.418 
 (.089) (.023) (.153) (.044) (.259) (.027) (.604) 
      
   
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne 
  
       
Occupational .493*** .080** .104 .128*** .178 .041 -.038 
 (.118) (.032) (.196) (.042) (.493) (.044) (.378) 
Firm size .493*** .128*** .230* .063** .361 .114** -.403 
 (.114) (.036) (.152) (.028) (95.99) (.045) (.419) 
Interaction .493*** .076** .289* .191*** -.270 .044 .163 
 (.119) (.031) (.191) (.055) (.478) (.044) (.864) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 10: Oaxaca decomposition results: 2010 
 
  Education Job   Other 
 Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
       
   
Tagadhari vs. Matwali 
   
       
Occupational .199*** .179*** .126 .041 -.192 .009 .036 
 (.071) (.037) (.180) (.031) (.108) (.029) (.232) 
Firm size .199*** .213*** .202 .032** -.095 -.003 -.150 
 (.070) .040) (.166) (.015) (.064) (.030) .334 
Interaction .199*** .150*** .131 .084* -.780* .002 .612 
 (.071) (.034) (.187) (.043) (.501) (.027) (.791) 
       
   
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne 
   
       
Occupational .489*** .380*** .084 .088* -.068 .044 -.039 
 (.122) (.071) (.310) (.046) (.071) (.055) (.528) 
Firm size .489*** .454*** .027 .078*** .801 .092* -.963 
 (.118) (.075) (.246) (.029) (1.22) (.055) (.592) 
Interaction .489*** .319*** .019 .227*** -.394 .028 .290 
 (.128) (.067) (.318) (.064) (.493) (.053) (1.25) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Table 11: Firm size distribution (before and after imputation) 
 
   Year: 2003     Year: 2010   
       
 
Reported Imputed Total Reported Imputed Total 
 Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
             
Small  firm 46 5.85 546 95.62 592 43.63 25 2.99 247 89.49 272 24.50 
Medium  firm 332 42.37 - - 333 24.54 278 33.29 - - 278 25.05 
Large  firm 407 51.78 25 4.38 432 31.83 532 63.72 28 10.14 560 50.45 
             
Total 785 100 571 100 1357 100 834 100 276 100 1110 100 
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Table 12: Distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry (before 
and after firm size imputation): 2003 
 
 
Reported Imputed Total 
       
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
       
Unskilled 145 18.45 99 17.34 244 17.98 
Professional 301 38.30 16 2.80 317 23.37 
Clerical 95 12.08 8 1.40 103 7.59 
Service 46 5.85 28 4.90 74 5.45 
Sales 37 4.71 10 1.75 47 3.46 
Agri-workers 20 2.54 15 2.63 35 2.58 
Skilled 141 18.07 395 69.18 537 39.57 
       
Industry Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
       
Agriculture 17 2.16 20 3.50 37 2.73 
Mining 11 1.40 6 1.05 17 1.25 
Manufacturing 152 19.34 172 30.13 324 23.88 
Construction 29 3.69 299 52.37 328 24.17 
Trade 71 9.03 16 2.80 87 6.41 
FRE 27 3.44 4 0.70 31 2.28 
Service sector 351 44.78 32 5.60 384 28.30 
Other 127 16.16 22 3.85 149 10.98 
       
Total 785 100 571 100 1357 100 
       
 
 
 
Table 13: Distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry (before 
and after firm size imputation): 2010 
 
 
Reported Imputed Total 
       
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
       
Unskilled 75 8.99 2 0.73 77 6.94 
Professional 199 23.86 22 7.97 221 19.91 
Clerical 156 18.71 6 2.17 162 14.59 
Service 107 12.83 58 21.01 165 14.86 
Sales 55 6.59 3 1.09 58 5.23 
Agri-worker 6 0.72 6 2.17 12 1.08 
Skilled 236 28.30 179 64.86 415 37.39 
       
Total 834 100 276 100 110 100 
       
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
       
Agricultural 7 0.84 18 6.52 25 2.24 
Mining 6 0.72 3 1.09 9 0.81 
Manufacturing 109 13.07 65 23.55 174 15.68 
Construction 28 3.36 117 42.39 145 13.06 
Trade 66 7.91 8 2.90 74 6.67 
FRE 158 18.94 30 10.87 188 16.94 
Service sector 55 6.59 5 1.81 60 5.41 
Other 405 48.57 30 10.87 435 39.19 
       
Total 834 100 276 100 1110 100 
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Table 14: Oaxaca decomposition results with imputed  firm size: 2003 
 
  
Education 
 
Job 
 
Other 
 Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
      
   
Tagadhari vs. Matwali 
  
       
Occupational .268*** .063** .059 .138*** .011 -.053* .050 
 (.053) (.028) (.066) (.034) (1.83) (.035) (.135) 
Firm size .268*** .107*** .071 .083** .025 -.032 .014 
 (.053) (.028) (.063) (.035) (.070) (.038) (.107) 
Interaction .268*** .044* .073 .211*** .026 -.086** .000 
 (.053) (.028) (.063) (.047) (.145) (.039) (.199) 
      
   
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne 
  
       
Occupational .387*** .082** -.000 .148*** .021 -.039 .175 
 (.069) (.036) (.070) (.036) (.284) (.042) (.172) 
Firm size .387*** .140*** .085 .097** -.031 .010 .086 
 (.068) (.037) (.065) (.042) (.300) (.043) (.119) 
Interaction .387*** .057* .042 .225*** .030 -.069* .102 
 (.070) (.036) (.071) (.052) (.037) (.044) (.224) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 15: Oaxaca decomposition results with imputed  firm size: 2010 
  Education Job   Other 
 Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
       
   
Tagadhari vs. Matwali 
   
       
Occupational .216*** .202*** .029 .041* -.299 .001 .242 
 (.061) (.035) (.137) (.026) (.327) (.027) (.225) 
Firm size .216*** .245*** .137 .013 -.101 -.011 -.067 
 (.061) (.038) (.130) (.016) (.192) (.029) (.167) 
Interaction .216*** .179*** .073 .076** .131 .003 -.246 
 (.068) (.035) (.143) (.033) (.788) (.026) (.642) 
       
   Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne    
       
Occupational .489*** .387*** .082 .086*** -.022 .034 -.078 
 (.084) (.061) (.162) (.033) (.021) (.047) (.443) 
Firm size .489*** .469*** .081 .043 -.063 .045 -.086 
 (.082) (.062) (.145) (.034) (.110) (.050) (.205) 
Interaction .489*** .342*** .063 .150*** 1.52 .034 -1.62 
 (.086) (.062) (.171) (.054) (1.98) (.048) (1.13) 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
 
significant at 1%. 
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i Most evidence on caste discrimination is based on data from India. In a study of wage differentials between 
scheduled and non-scheduled caste migrants in Delhi, Banerjee and Knight (1985) finds that low-caste workers are 
more likely to be engaged in traditional low-paid jobs. By extending the conventional decomposition methodology to 
include occupational access as part of a worker's pre-market endowment, they find that a significant part of the 
caste wage differential was attributable to differences in access to better paid occupations. Das and Dutta (2007) 
estimates the caste wage differential in both regular and casual jobs in the Indian labor market. The results show 
that a substantial differential exists between scheduled and non-scheduled castes in regular jobs, but not in casual 
ones, with almost two thirds of the differential in regular jobs being attributable to endowment effects (educational 
and occupational variables). In a study of regular salaried jobs in India, Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) found 
that endowment differences are larger than current market wage differences in explaining the caste wage 
differentials, and that the most important type of difference in endowments was the difference in occupation across 
castes. For Nepal, Cameron (1995), Bhattachan, Sunar, and Bhattachan (2009) and Karki (2007) analyze caste 
wage discrimination. All of them find strong evidence of caste discrimination against Dalit, although only the latter 
applies the Oaxaca decomposition method. 
ii In perfect competitive markets discrimination disappears with new entry of less prejudiced competitors into the 
market. Similarly, if group differences in ability are perceived to exist by employers but are not real, as the theory of 
statistical discrimination assumes, employers will update their beliefs over time (Darity and Mason, 1998). 
iii The NLSS has separate questions for agriculture and non-agriculture wage employment. We only consider 
respondents in the non-agriculture employment. However, agriculture can also be a selected as an industry in the 
non-agriculture wage employment questionnaire. 
iv Average exchange rates between NPR and USD were 73.99 and 71.80 in 2003 and 2010, respectively. Source: 
Nepal Rastra Bank. 
v Note that there is a significant change in the industry classification between 2003 and 2010 regarding the other 
category, which represents industry not responded or responded as other. 
vi Workers from this caste do not have representation in the FRE industry in both periods and FRE, mining and 
agricultural industries in 2010 
 
